Abstract: I argue that the very idea of a freely embraced eternal destiny in hell is deeply incoherent and, quite apart from its incoherence, implies that we are free to sin with impunity forever and to defeat God's justice forever as well.
2 among the most conservative, are prepared to swallow an idea as unpalatable as that. Most would concede that an eternal torture chamber is utterly inconsistent with a supremely loving and supremely powerful being. But if that is true, then any theist who seeks to retain a doctrine of hell must revise the traditional doctrine in one of two ways: either by rejecting the idea of unbearable suffering or by rejecting the idea that the suffering literally endures forever. Over the past decade, a number of Christian philosophers have set forth a free will defense, or perhaps even a free will theodicy, of hell 1 and have therefore chosen the first alternative; they have in effect replaced the idea of unbearable suffering, which no one could freely embrace forever, with that of a freely chosen life apart from God.
In what follows, however, I shall argue that free will theodicies of hell require an unexpected assumption: namely, that we are free not only to act wrongly-to sin, if you willbut to sin forever with at least a degree of impunity. They require, in other words, the assumption that we are free to defeat God's justice forever and without ever being forced to acknowledge the true nature of our selfish acts. I shall also argue that such theodicies are deeply incoherent in any case and that Christians should therefore reject them in favor of the alternative idea of hell as a forcibly imposed but temporary correction of some kind.
Freely embracing an eternal destiny
For all of their talk about freedom and being free in our relationship to God, those who propose a free will theodicy of hell rarely, if ever, offer a clear explanation of what it might mean to embrace an eternal destiny freely. Here several preliminary observations are perhaps in order.
(1) It is easy enough to imagine how an eternal destiny might hinge upon a free choice of some kind. For suppose that I should choose freely whether or not to eat spinach on my next birthday, and suppose further that, unbeknownst to me, my eternal destiny in heaven or hell 3 should hinge upon which choice I happen to make. Or suppose, to be no less absurd, that my eternal destiny should hinge upon whether I freely choose to eat escargot at some time during my earthly life. These would clearly not be cases of freely choosing an eternal destiny; much less would they be cases of freely embracing such a destiny in the sense to be explained below. And similarly for the case where my eternal destiny is thought to hinge upon my freely accepting
Christ (whatever, exactly, that might mean) during my earthly life. If I regard Jesus Christ as just another human prophet like Mohammed and therefore go through my entire earthly life without ever accepting the Christian claims about him, it hardly follows that I have freely embraced an eternal destiny apart from God.
(2) It is important, then, to distinguish between our free choices and their unintended consequences, the latter of which, by definition, are not freely embraced and may even occur against one's will. Hardened criminals typically do everything within their power to avoid a prison sentence, and not even drug addicts freely choose to become addicted to their drug of choice. Some addicts may freely choose to take a drug in the first place, or to begin experimenting with it, but they no more freely choose their addiction than someone on an unhealthy diet freely chooses to have a heart attack. It may sometimes happen, of course, that the bad consequences of someone's bad choices, even though unintended, are nonetheless foreseen as a potential danger, or perhaps in some cases as a practical certainty. For though most criminals probably commit their criminal acts in the hope of avoiding a prison sentence, a man full of hatred may commit murder in full public view, knowing that he will be apprehended immediately and punished in the end. The man's present hatred, in other words, may outweigh his present fear of punishment, and this might be true even where the likely punishment would be his own execution. But even in a case such as this, where the punishment is foreseen as a informed choice, I contend, would be that one never comes to regret the choice at some later time; for whenever one does make a choice and then comes to regret it, one of two explanations will hold: either (a) one incorrectly assessed some aspect of the choice when making it, in which case it was not fully informed, or (b) some compulsion determined the choice, in which case it was not truly free. But some may want to question my own conviction about this. Is it not at least possible, they will ask, to make a free choice in the full knowledge that one will eventually 5 come to regret it? Even if this were possible, however, the mere fact that one should later come to regret a choice in the sense of wishing that one had never made it in the first place would prove that one no longer fully endorses it; and furthermore, if one should ever come to regret a chosen destiny, then one either remains free to opt out of that chosen destiny (even as one remains free to change a career long after choosing to enter it) or the initially chosen destiny comes to be forcibly imposed at the very instant that it comes to be regretted. God survive without regret a full disclosure of truth about the chosen destiny? And even if it could survive such a disclosure (either because S's bad choices confirm S in a systematic deception of some kind, or because they so alter S's character that S loses the capacity to regret having chosen such a miserable destiny), it still would not follow that S has freely embraced a destiny apart from God. If I am unaware that a pill will induce a systematic delusion, or perhaps even destroy my capacity for regret, then even if I swallow the pill freely, it hardly follows that I have freely embraced all of these unforeseen consequences. Nor is the case where S chooses a destiny apart from God any different in this regard: So long as S would have chosen differently had S known the consequences, it simply does not follow that S has freely embraced these unforeseen consequences. Given (FED), therefore, we seem to confront an important asymmetry: Whereas a freely embraced destiny in fellowship with God is quite possible, a freely embraced destiny apart from God seems not to be possible at all.
Can a decision to reject God forever be both free and fully informed? For reasons similar to those just set forth, I have defended the following proposition in previous papers: Given the Christian understanding of God, the very idea of someone making a free and fully informed decision to reject God forever, or of someone freely embracing an eternal destiny apart from God, is deeply incoherent and therefore logically impossible. 3 In so arguing I have relied, of course, upon a particular view of God's metaphysical nature and of his relationship to us. If God is supremely loving, then he wills for us exactly what, at the most fundamental level, we want for ourselves; he wills that we should experience supreme happiness, that our deepest yearnings should be satisfied, and that all of our needs should be met.
Insofar as we, unlike God, are mired in ambiguity and subject to ignorance, illusion, and deception, we will no doubt misjudge our real wants and yearnings repeatedly and especially the means of satisfying them. But if God is supremely wise, he will not misjudge these matters himself; and if he is supremely powerful, he will also have the power to correct our misjudgements over time without interfering with our freedom to act upon them in the first place.
Indeed, our freedom to act upon our misjudgements may even be an essential part of the correcting process. For once we begin acting upon them-upon the illusion that we can benefit ourselves at the expense of others, for example-we can then begin the long, sometimes painful, process of learning from experience why love and reconciliation are better than selfishness and separation. On the other hand, he may mean: that one knows all the relevant facts and ascribes the proper weight to the things known. The latter entails that one has additionally structured one's desires so that they properly reflect the importance of what is known. 4 Here Murray supposes that, with respect to a given set of known facts, two people with different interests and backgrounds might weigh the known facts differently, which is obviously correct. He supposes further that two people might know all the relevant facts about some decision and nonetheless weigh the known facts differently, and this may also be true in certain kinds of cases. For many decisions have little moral significance and involve matters of less than ultimate importance to the individual making the decision. But if Murray's distinction is to have any relevance to my own claim about the impossibility of rejecting God forever, then he must adopt an additional assumption that seems to me quite incoherent: the assumption that two people, each rational enough to qualify as free moral agents, might know all of the relevant facts about the ultimate source of their own happiness and the roots of their own misery, on the one hand, and nonetheless weigh these facts very differently, on the other. Has Murray or anyone else provided grounds for thinking this a genuine possibility?
The nearest thing to an argument that I have found at this point is the empirical observation that people sometimes appear knowingly to act against their own interest, perhaps even their best interest in some cases. Murray thus comments: 'Someone can be fully aware of the fact that smoking or having an unhealthy diet or engaging in promiscuous sex is extremely dangerous, and yet, he or she can still choose to freely engage in the practices.' 5 And in a similar vein, Charles Seymour comments that 'a person may continue to pursue bad habits even after 9 experiencing their painful consequences'. 6 As an illustration, Seymour cites a psychiatric case of a manic-depressive, no less, who could not be persuaded to stay on his lithium, despite the disastrous consequences of going off of it. According to psychiatrist, Kay Jamison, 'Lithium worked remarkably well for him, but once his hallucinations and abject terror stopped, he would quit taking it.' 7 And Seymour interprets this to mean that the poor man was 'released from his bondage to suicidal desire by lithium, yet he [freely?] returned to this bondage again and again'. have some horrendous side effects-nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and trembling being commonand these merely provide additional reasons for not taking it. Indeed, one side effect, even when the lithium seems to be working, is that it can itself cause mental illness and irrational behavior.
So I see little point to this example, nor do I see much point in citing, as Murray does, the examples of smoking and an unhealthy diet.
Yes, we know that smoking is dangerous. So also is mountain climbing and hang gliding.
But the mere fact that an activity includes a degree of risk to one's physical health hardly renders it utterly irrational in the way, so I have claimed, rejecting God forever would be. And yes, given the different circumstances in which different people find themselves, not to mention the ambiguities of our earthly lives, some will no doubt choose a riskier lifestyle than others will choose. There is also the matter of shortsightedness: where someone knowingly jeopardizes some future good in order to satisfy some present (and more immediate) desire. The possibility of such shortsightedness is due, in large measure, to the huge difference between an abstract knowledge of some danger lurking in the distant future, something easily thrust out of one's immediate consciousness, and the actual experience of misery in the present. But as C. S. Lewis once pointed out forcefully, the latter, unlike the former, is impossible to ignore:
Now error and sin both have this property, that the deeper they are the less their victim suspects their existence; they are masked evil. Pain is unmasked, unmistakable evil: every man knows that something is wrong when he is being hurt…. And pain is not only immediately recognisable evil, but evil impossible to ignore.
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As Lewis here uses the term 'pain', it signifies not merely a bodily sensation, but 'Any experience, whether physical or mental, which the patient dislikes.' 12 I prefer the term 'misery'.
So long as misery is merely a threat lying in the distant future, or merely a potential danger rather than a sure thing, one can easily discount it in the present or, as Murray says, assign an improper weight to the potential danger. But once intense misery thrusts itself into immediate consciousness, it becomes harder and harder, and finally impossible, to ignore. It is simply not possible to desire intense misery and suffering for its own sake, nor is it possible not to desire supreme happiness for its own sake.
So imagine now a person S in a state of prolonged misery or suffering or sadness, such as one might experience in hell as traditionally conceived; imagine also that S knows all of the 11 relevant facts about the source of human happiness and suffers from no more illusions about the source of S's own misery. Given that all of S's ignorance has now been removed and all of S's illusions have finally been shattered, what possible motive might remain for embracing such eternal misery freely? It will not do merely to point out that S's newly acquired perspective, coming about as it does after going to hell, has come about too late; for either S retains the option to repent and to become reconciled to God even after entering hell, or else S remains there against S's will. Nor will it do to suggest that, even in hell, S might continue to reject God under some description other than 'choosing eternal misery for oneself', because we are here supposing that all of S's relevant beliefs are true and all relevant ignorance has been removed. If S should reject God under some false description, then at least one of S's relevant beliefs would be false;
and if all relevant ignorance has been removed, then S would be under no illusion about this:
One cannot reject the ultimate source of one's happiness without rejecting one's own deepest desires and yearnings and without choosing perpetual misery for oneself as well.
The question of motive
The question I am raising, then, is this: What conceivable motive could both survive in a context free from 'ignorance, deception, and bondage to desire' and prompt someone to choose The most frequently cited motive for someone's rejecting God is, of course, pride. William
Lane Craig thus speaks of 'the stubborn refusal to submit one's will to that of another', and he goes on to ask: 'Is it not possible that the will to self-autonomy be so strong in some persons that they will act irrationally in preferring self-rule to God's rule'? 13 But the very question that Craig raises presupposes an incoherent distinction between self-rule and God's rule, between selfautonomy and submission to God. If sin delivers the will into a kind of bondage, as Martin Luther believed; if sinners gradually become 'a prisoner of bad desires', as Richard Swinburne has put it; 14 and if the mark of a bad character is the inability to follow one's own judgement concerning what is best, as I have elsewhere suggested, 15 then there can be no mastery of self, no self-rule, no real autonomy in the absence of submission to God. Indeed, given the Christian understanding of God, submission to God is not, in the end, submission to an external will or to an external power at all; it is merely a way of acknowledging and honoring one's own deepest desires and yearnings, the very desires and yearnings that God in his love also yearns to satisfy.
So only a terrible confusion and a host of faulty judgements could possibly lead one to the conclusion that self-rule and self-autonomy stand in opposition to submission to God.
Like Craig, Jonathan Kvanvig also sees pride as manifesting itself in a preference for 'selfexaltation or self-determination over anything else', 16 and he suggests further that, for some, 'anything is preferable…to the abandonment of self that union with God entails'. . But what are we to make of Kvanvig's suggestion that, for some of those rational enough to qualify as moral agents, 'anything is preferable' to such abandonment? Is this not again simply incoherent? You might as well say that, for some rational agents, anything is preferable to supreme happiness and nothing is preferable to the misery that alienation and separation inevitably bring into a life. Nor does Kvanvig explain, any more than Craig does, how a prisoner of bad desires, someone whose will is in bondage to sin, could be capable of self-determination.
Why not say that a failure to discern (or anticipate) the full extent to which immorality brings enslavement (and therefore prevents self-determination) is precisely one of the deceptions that makes immorality possible in the first place? It seems to me, therefore, that those defending a free will theodicy of hell should simply bite the proverbial bullet, as Jerry Walls does, and admit that a free and fully informed decision to reject God forever is logically impossible. Walls writes: 'I want to agree that those who choose evil, and ultimately hell, are indeed deceived.' 19 And again: 'We can grant that Talbott is correct in holding that the choice of evil is impossible for anyone who has a fully formed awareness that God is the source of happiness and sin the cause of misery.' 20 But Walls goes on to make a two-fold claim: first, that the deceptions of the damned are self-imposed, a form of self-deception, and second, that our freedom to reject God forever includes the freedom to cling to our illusions and to our self-imposed deceptions forever as well. For if God were to shatter all of our illusions, remove all of our ignorance, and resolve all of the ambiguities that make a decision to reject God possible, then we would no longer be free in our relation to him. So it is to these matters that I shall now turn in the following two sections.
Two kinds of compulsion
Behind any free will theodicy of hell lies the standard libertarian analysis of free will, and that analysis involves two crucial claims: (1) a person S performs an action A freely at some time t only if it should also be within S's power at t to refrain from A at t, and (2) it is within S's power at t to refrain from A at t only if refraining from A at t is psychologically possible for S at t. For the record, I remain a libertarian myself in the sense that, in my opinion, creaturely freedom could never exist in a fully deterministic universe. But in a companion to this paper, I
shall nonetheless argue against the standard libertarian analysis, as just set forth, and also against any other analysis implying that we do the right thing freely only when acting wrongly remains a 15 psychological possibility. 21 For if that were true, then God himself would never do the right thing (or act in a loving, as opposed to a hateful, way) freely.
A full examination of this issue, however, would require a paper in itself. So for the purposes of this paper, I shall continue to use the term 'freedom' in the standard libertarian way and simply point out how few first person accounts of dramatic conversions sound anything like libertarian free choices. A host of free choices-including bad ones that unexpectedly lead to disaster and are thereby corrected, perhaps even against one's will-are no doubt an important part of the whole process that results in the typical conversion. But more often than not, the final act of submission seems to occur in a context where the alternative is no longer psychologically possible at all. When C. S. Lewis described his own conversion, for example, he even used such terms as 'checkmate' and 'compulsion' to describe the final act of surrender. Though he always stressed libertarian free will when he tried to imagine the damnation of a soul, the damnation of The words compelle intrare, compel them to come in, have been so abused by wicked men that we shudder at them; but, properly understood, they plumb the 16 depth of the Divine mercy. The hardness of God is kinder than the softness of men, and His compulsion is our liberation.
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Stressing the right kind of compulsion in conversion, as even C. S. Lewis did, has several advantages for a Christian, not the least of which is that it seems to accord perfectly with the Pauline understanding of salvation as wholly a matter of God's grace. 26 Even with respect to the Hitlers and the Stalins of this world, Christians have typically wanted to say, 'There but for the grace of God go I.' 27 And either this is mere cant or false modesty when I say it, or it is a way of acknowledging that the difference between Hitler and me is not that I have made better free choices than he did. We might express this, Craig thus writes: 'It may well be the case that for some people the degree of revelation that would have to be imparted to them in order to secure their salvation would have to be so stunning that their freedom to disobey would be effectively removed…'. 30 And as for my own view that separation from God can bring only greater and greater misery into a life, Jerry Walls compares such a view to the medieval practice of inducing a plea by pressing the accused under increasingly heavy iron weights. 31 He then goes on to comment: 'We do not have the 18 constitutional strength or capacity to absorb ever greater amounts of torment', 32 and he finally concludes:
If it is not within our power to avoid this knowledge [of what separation from God really entails], neither is it within our power to choose damnation. And if this choice is not within our power-as opposed to being psychologically possible for us-then we are not free with respect to it. Hence God cannot always remove our (self-imposed) deception without interfering with our freedom. If God allows us to retain libertarian freedom, some illusions may endure forever.
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It seems to me, however, that such an argument, like many philosophical arguments about freedom, merely illustrate why we all need to heed Wittgenstein's warning about what can happen 'when language goes on holiday'. 34 Not that I would reject the substance of what Walls says, which is this: Only someone mired in illusion or deception of some kind would be free,
given the standard libertarian analysis, to choose evil. So neither God, who is subject to no illusions at all, nor the redeemed in heaven, who possess the beatific vision and are therefore no longer subject to any relevant illusions, are free to do evil, given the standard libertarian analysis.
As Walls himself points out, 'The redeemed in heaven find sin impossible…because their character, shaped by the clear knowledge that God is the source of happiness, will not permit it.' implies at most a rejection of some caricature of God or some false conception, not a rejection of the true God himself. By the very nature of the case, therefore, a free decision to reject the true God, whether it be fully informed or less than fully informed, seems to be logically impossible,
given the Christian understanding of God. And an impossible freedom is not one that God could enhance, nor is it one with which he might sensibly be said to interfere.
So again I ask: Just what specific freedom does God interfere with when he shatters our illusions and corrects our faulty judgements? One thing is indeed clear: God cannot shatter our illusions without, at the same time, preventing us from clinging to these very illusions forever.
So perhaps the relevant freedom here is merely the freedom to cling forever to those illusions and faulty judgements that make immorality possible and, whether we know it or not, prevent a full union with God. According to Walls, we are free to act upon such illusions and faulty judgements as these and also to cling to them forever even as we act upon them. But as I shall argue in the final section below, that too is logically impossible and it undermines, in any event, the whole point of hell, as traditionally understood.
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The fatal flaw in free will theodicies of hell
The place to begin, perhaps, is with a fundamental incoherence in C. S. Lewis's account of hell. According to Lewis, it is an objective truth that union with the divine 'Nature is bliss and separation from it horror'. 36 But if that is an objective truth, even as it is an objective truth that a hand placed upon a hot stove will burn badly, then an important question arises: How could anyone, rational enough to qualify as a free moral agent, choose an eternity of horror over an eternity of bliss, or actually prefer hell to heaven? Would it not be far easier to imagine someone with a normal nervous system actually preferring the burning of a hot stove to the gentle warmth of 85-degree tap water? In the face of such questions as these, Lewis backs away from the idea of an objective horror and begins talking as if it were all a matter of perspective. 'There may be a truth', he insists, 'in the saying that "hell is hell, not from its own point of view, but from the heavenly point of view."...It is only to the damned that their fate could seem less than unendurable.' 37 But you might as well say, 'It is only to those who freely choose to burn themselves on the stove that such a burning could seem less than unendurable.' If those freely choosing to burn themselves have a normal nervous system, experience normal sensations of pain, and are rational enough to qualify as free agents, then such a statement makes no coherent sense at all.
Nor can one escape the charge of incoherence here by appealing, as Walls and Lewis both do, to an illusion that in effect takes the hell out of hell, at least as far as the damned are concerned. Following Lewis, Walls suggests that 'hell may afford its inhabitants a kind of gratification which motivates the choice to go there'; 38 and more than that, says Walls, the damned may even experience a kind of illusory happiness. 21 Those in hell may be almost happy, and this may explain why they insist on staying there. They do not, of course, experience even a shred of genuine happiness. But perhaps they experience a certain perverse sense of satisfaction, a distorted sort of pleasure.
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Though Walls denies that the damned are genuinely happy, he does not deny that they believe themselves to be happy; to the contrary, he insists that, for some lost souls, the illusion of happiness may endure forever and with sufficient conviction to explain why they never leave their preferred abode in hell.
Those who prefer hell to heaven have convinced themselves that it is better. In their desire to justify their choice of evil, they have persuaded themselves that whatever satisfaction they experience from evil is superior to the joy which God offers. In sum, you cannot coherently claim both that hell is an objective horror and that it is all a matter of perspective, as if two persons, each rational enough to qualify as a free moral agent, might disagree about this; and if the damned are indeed free moral agents, then neither can you coherently claim both that their beliefs, being objectively false, are illusory and that they can continue to act upon these supposed illusions forever without eventually shattering them to pieces.
Quite apart from the matter of incoherence, moreover, it is important to appreciate how the view under consideration undermines the whole point of hell, as traditionally understood. Is not the whole point to prevent the unrepentant from sinning with impunity forever? Lewis himself illustrates the point nicely in The Problem of Pain, where he begins his discussion of hell by asking us to imagine an utterly wicked man 'who has risen to wealth or power by a continued course of treachery and cruelty'. 42 One of the best writers I have ever encountered, Lewis's own description makes us feel this man's wickedness in all of its horror. He also asks us to imagine that the man is never 'tormented by remorse or even misgivings', that he eats like a schoolboy and sleeps like a healthy infant, that he is 'without a care in the world', and that he is 'unshakably confident…that God and man are fools whom he has got the better of…'. 43 Would it not be an outrage of justice, Lewis in effect asks, for such a man to remain content with his own actions and never to be forced-even against his own will, if necessary-to see them for what they are? Lewis himself puts it this way: 'In a sense, it is better for the creature itself, even if it never becomes good, that it should know itself a failure, a mistake. If he were free to cling forever to his 'ghastly illusion' even as he acts upon it, assuming that this were even possible, then for that very reason he would also be free to sin with impunity and to defeat God's justice forever.
Lewis claims, as does Walls, that it all comes down to free will: 'In creating beings with free will omnipotence from the outset submits to the possibility of…defeat.' 47 But really, why
